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ABSTRACT 
The rise of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning 
concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying 
conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show 
how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. 
This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But 
there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and logical concepts, but 
many concepts of interest to philosophers (experimental and otherwise) are essentially normative. With formal 
epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains. 
 
1. Introduction. Identifying and evaluating conceptual content is at the core of philosophical 
practice. Concepts are indispensable constituents of arguments and theories, and conceptual 
judgments often motivate or undermine the development of both. Moreover, subtle 
disagreements about conceptual content often underlie much broader philosophical debates. But 
despite its fundamental role, the rules of engagement for disputes over conceptual content remain 
obscure.2 
There is a received view. Traditional conceptual analysis places principal weight on 
intuitive judgments across possible scenarios. Such judgments are taken to establish parameters 
                                                
1 Thanks to André Carus, Josh Knobe, Al Mele, Erich Reck, Jonah Schupbach, Eric Schwitzgebel and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments. Audiences at the 2011 Pittsburgh-Tilburg workshop, at UC-Riverside, at 
California Institute of Technology, at the 2013 meeting of the Canadian Society for the History and Philosophy of 
Science, and at Southern Methodist University provided similarly valuable feedback. 
2 Partly responsible for this is the fact that philosophers remain divided over the nature of concepts. Some view 
concepts as abstract objects that serve as constituents of propositions (see Peacocke 1992); others view concepts as 
structured mental representations (see Margolis and Laurence 2007). We favor the latter, but the positions advanced 
below do not require endorsement of either view. 
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that successful accounts of concepts must respect. Intuitions regarding a concept C thereby 
function as primary data for which analyses of C account.3 
Adherence to this approach has been unsettled by serious doubts about the epistemic 
import of intuition, doubts exacerbated by data-driven approaches to conceptual issues 
championed by experimental philosophers (see Weinberg et al. 2001; Weinberg 2007). But these 
concerns, however compelling, leave critical questions about proper positive philosophical 
methodology unaddressed. Principally: if not by intuition, how could (and should) conceptual 
content be identified and evaluated? 
Rudolf Carnap formulated a compelling answer: explication. The general philosophical 
significance of explication has recently been rearticulated and defended (see Carus 2007; Maher 
2007; Kitcher 2008; Justus 2012). This paper enhances and extends the case in two ways. First, 
we identify an unrecognized consilience between explication and experimental philosophy (x-
phi), one that clarifies the philosophical import of the latter. Second, we diagnose a deficiency in 
Carnap’s original account of explication, and show how it can be fixed. 
Section 2 begins by discussing the controversy over x-phi’s contribution to philosophy, 
one which divides experimental philosophers themselves. We criticize the so-called positive 
program for x-phi as it is commonly characterized, and argue that explication furnishes a 
valuable new role for x-phi. Section 3 develops a novel positive program for x-phi we call 
explication preparation, which Carnap (1955) himself seems to have anticipated. In brief, x-phi 
supplies the necessary clarification of conceptual content that constitutes the raw material for 
explication. In so doing, x-phi facilitates the explicative evaluation of conceptual content. 
                                                
3 This interpretation of the use of intuitions in conceptual analysis has been denied by Cappelen (2012).  In 
interesting discussions of Cappelen’s position, Bengson (forthcoming) and Chalmers (forthcoming) make 
compelling cases that philosophers do in fact frequently rely on intuitions as evidence. This is not to deny that other 
sources of evidence (e.g., arguments) are also important. 
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Section 4 uncovers a deficiency in Carnap’s rationale for explication, one that poses a 
potential limitation for this methodological marriage. In continuity with scientific practice, 
Carnap considered explications valuable to the extent they enhanced what he called 
‘fruitfulness.’ For empirical concepts, fruitfulness was measured in the same underlying currency 
in which science measures epistemic success: well-confirmed generalizations. But many 
concepts of philosophical interest are decidedly normative. Carnap said nothing about how 
fruitfulness should be conceptualized for such concepts. Using the epistemically normative 
concepts of formal epistemology as a case study, we illustrate the severity of the challenge. 
Section 5 shows how x-phi assisted explication can be fruitful for normative domains. As an 
auspicious consequence, formal epistemology can avoid overreliance on intuition, and thereby 
the fate of traditional conceptual analysis. 
 
2. X-Phi’s Philosophical Value. X-phi privileges empirical data over other sources of 
information about concepts and selectively appropriates experimental methods used by 
psychologists to acquire it. The typical protocol involves asking laypeople to apply concepts to 
specific questions about carefully concocted scenarios (Did X intentionally A? Does X know that 
p?). Replacing speculation about the conceptual judgments people would make with data about 
the judgments people actually do make is the overriding agenda. The results have yielded 
surprising, counterintuitive, and controversial information about concepts such as intentional 
action (Knobe 2003) and knowledge (Weinberg et al. 2001), among others. 
Surveys have thereby proved valuable, but they do not exhaust x-phi’s purview. X-phi 
should be understood in much broader terms; its focus, scope, and methods continue to evolve. 
For example, more sophisticated statistical measures and methods are becoming commonplace in 
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x-phi as collaboration increases between experimental philosophers and psychologists. In fact, 
the research programs of many psychologists––which involve methods that go far beyond 
surveys––address philosophical issues (e.g. Greene 2003 and Malle 2004), and it is unclear what 
distinguishes this work from x-phi other than disciplinary label. In general, x-phi “takes the 
concerns with moral and conceptual issues that have so long been associated with philosophy 
and connects them with the use of systematic and well-controlled empirical investigations that 
one more typically finds in psychology” (Knobe et al. 2010, 157). 
This characterization captures x-phi’s empirical focus and underscores the fact that 
surveys constitute but one facet of the program. But it also exposes a meta-philosophical lacuna 
that could threaten x-phi’s philosophical value. How can empirical data, which describe 
concepts, play any direct role in the normative evaluation and determination of conceptual 
content usually thought to be the proper (and primary) purview of philosophy? Critics have 
exploited this lacuna in various ways. 
 
Kauppinen (2007) distinguishes between surface and robust intuitions, and argues x-phi 
only measures the former. Philosophy apparently only concerns the latter: intuitions of 
competent participants operating in sufficiently ideal conditions where only semantic (as 
opposed to pragmatic) considerations matter (2007, 97). Since, Kauppinen says, only 
philosophical dialogue can elicit robust intuitions, philosophical claims “cannot be tested 
with methods of positivist social science” (2007, 95). Although x-phi results require 
explanation, Kauppinen maintains it is explanation of a primarily psychological rather 
than philosophical kind (2007, 108). 
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For Jackson (2011), x-phi results are relevant for determining what concepts we actually 
have. But he argues that much of philosophy is concerned with the concepts we should 
have. While x-phi results might constitute “an essential first step in the discussion of the 
normative question” (481), Jackson holds that “polls won’t be relevant to assessing the 
final product” (480). 
 
Sosa (2008) argues x-phi results fail to undermine the role of intuition in philosophy, 
which analogically functions (he suggests) as observation functions in empirical science. 
Intuitions provide access to the proper subject matter of philosophical inquiry, for 
example, the “evaluative or normative truths of epistemology” (239). Sosa considers the 
possibility that “some crucial difference between natural phenomena and evaluative 
phenomena…rules out any such analogy,” (239) but concludes that even if it did 
philosophy, not x-phi, would point the way forward. Sosa’s rhetorically asks: “how could 
we possibly approach such a question except philosophically, through the sort of 
reflection plus dialectic that depends crucially on philosophical intuition?” (239). 
 
These criticisms exhibit subtle differences but share a common worry.  Put bluntly, the 
worry is that the phenomena motivating psychological theorizing (and x-phi) are distinct in kind 
from what motivates philosophical theorizing. One is a strictly descriptive enterprise, the other is 
essentially normative. If so, the data x-phi generates and analyzes cannot dictate––perhaps in 
principle or even partially––the content of philosophical theories. 
The worry is acute. Experimental philosophers themselves are concerned with 
demonstrating the philosophical import of their discipline but divided on how to do so, 
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prompting Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 129) to call x-phi “a house divided.” Unsurprisingly, 
the proper role of intuition in identifying and evaluating conceptual content is the main dispute.4 
Two views have emerged, the so-called positive and negative programs (Alexander et al. 2010).5 
As currently conceptualized, the former gives intuition a central role; the latter downplays its 
significance. 
Different reactions to data on the well-known Knobe effect indicate how the programs 
diverge. In x-phi’s early days, Knobe (2003) discovered a surprising asymmetry regarding 
conceptions of intentional action. When an agent brings about a negative side effect A of 
performing an action, most people say A was done intentionally. But when an agent brings about 
a positive side effect B, most people say B was done unintentionally. This asymmetry is striking 
and was initially thought to reveal something significant about the folk concept of intentional 
action. Yet subsequent research shows the asymmetry is subject to order and priming effects 
(Mele and Cushman 2008), is moderated by individual personality differences (Feltz and Cokely 
2009), and that a significant minority of folk manifest no asymmetry (Mele and Cushman 2008). 
Beyond the folk, these kinds of patterns have also been found among professional philosophers 
(Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2012). 
For negative program proponents, these kinds of results constitute strong evidence that 
intuitions rarely (if ever) provide trustworthy data about concepts. For intentional action 
specifically, the conceptual vicissitudes revealed seem to impede rather than advance a positive 
analysis of the concept. And this is not an isolated case. Far from revealing concepts with 
unequivocal content, x-phi generally uncovers unprincipled patterns in conceptual judgments. 
                                                
4 We remain neutral on the exact nature of intuitions: whether intuitions are beliefs, dispositions to believe, 
intellectual seemings with a characteristic phenomenology, or whatever (see Pust 2012). The main issue here is the 
evidential status of intuitions. 
5 Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (2007, 126) describe a similar split. The minor differences between the characterizations 
are left unaddressed. 
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For example, many folk reject the apparently highly intuitive principle that one knows p only if 
one believes p (Myers-Shulz and Schwitzgebel 2013). Intuitions about scenarios involving 
concepts of interest to philosophers appear to display the same cognitive diversity studies have 
revealed in other contexts (Weinberg et al. 2001). Rather than complement the traditional 
philosophical emphasis on intuition, x-phi seems to be subverting it.  
With varying degrees of vigor, positive program proponents reject this implication. 
Instead, a two-step method is usually defended. For a given concept C, the first task is 
developing a theory explaining the psychological processes responsible for intuitions about C 
(once those intuitions have been systematically collected and assessed). Second, the theory is 
used to vet those intuitions: to inform judgments about their epistemic significance. The idea is 
that “[i]t is precisely when we are aware of the features our intuitions track that we are able to 
reflectively criticize whether these intuitions are warranted, and whether these intuitions should 
carry weight in a mature philosophical account” (Sripada and Konrath 2011, 375). 
The first step has obvious value, and is one to which x-phi makes a significant 
contribution (see §3). Our complaint concerns the philosophical weight accorded intuition in the 
second step. Consider, for example, how Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) interpret data that 
suggest the folk are more likely to claim an agent knew a side effect of her action would occur if 
the effect was negative (e.g. harming the environment) rather than positive (e.g. helping the 
environment). After discussing five potential explanations of psychological processes 
responsible for these intuitions, they endorse a model that holds the intuitions “arise from general 
facts about the relationship between folk psychology and normative assessment rather than from 
features that are unique to the individual concepts in question” (493). Next, and crucially, this 
model is taken to support philosophical claims about knowledge, such as: “whether a subject 
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knows that p may depend upon the moral status of actions the subject performs in light of the 
belief that p” (495). On this approach, proper determination of the ‘knowledge’ concept responds 
largely to the best psychological theory of folk intuitions about knowledge. 
If pinpointing how humans currently deploy concepts is the goal, this empirically-driven 
methodology has obvious promise. But the second step requires a  methodology for evaluating 
conceptual content and determining the concepts we should have. And in this regard, the positive 
program needs development. The problem is the continued emphasis on intuition. Understanding 
psychological processes responsible for intuitions about concepts may identify potential sources 
of cognitive error, but how this understanding lends prescriptive force to intuitions that remain 
even after such errors have been corrected is opaque. 
In effect, the shared focus on intuition aligns the positive program with traditional 
conceptual analysis: “[the positive program] shares with traditional armchair philosophy that 
intuitions about X are a trustworthy source of evidence or data for philosophical theorizing about 
X” (Alexander et al. 2010, 300). As such, though x-phi stresses intuitions be gathered in 
controlled, statistically rigorous, and systematic ways, conceptual analysis and the positive 
program as it is typically understood share a similar philosophical agenda and fate. On both 
approaches intuitions regarding hypothetical scenarios are intended to serve their traditional 
function: justify purported counterexamples to analyses of concepts, support premises, and shift 
the burden of proof in philosophical debates.6 But this alignment exposes the positive program to 
now well-known criticisms (see Weinberg et al. 2012): 
 
                                                
6 It is this justificatory role that we find particularly problematic. We recognize that intuitions sometimes function as 
useful heuristics for theory development. On this point, see Bengson’s (forthcoming) interesting discussion of the 
way intuitions sometimes serve what he calls “prompting” and “problematizing” functions. 
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(i) Intuitions are but one source of data about concepts and other sources––e.g., 
studies of usage drawn from linguistics and anthropology, as well as 
investigations of the psychological sources of intuition (see Scholl 2007)––are 
likely to provide more reliable information. Absent a compelling argument that 
intuitive considerations (even suitably empirically vetted) somehow penetrate to 
the heart of things while empirically scrutable data sources from anthropology, 
linguistics, sociology, and elsewhere fall short, it is far from clear intuitions 
deserve the privileged cognitive status they are often accorded. How they alone, 
primarily, or significantly lend prescriptive force to philosophical theories is 
particularly unclear. 
(ii) Intuition-based traditional conceptual analysis has a shoddy epistemic track 
record (Harman 1994). That intuition often leads empirical inquiry astray is 
unsurprising (Ladyman and Ross 2007). But history also indicates intuition 
unreliably guides conceptual inquiry. As a prominent proponent of conceptual 
analysis recently noted, “The problem for armchair philosophy…is the actual or 
potential disagreement that pervades our field. This is not disagreement that pits 
experienced philosophers against street-corner respondents. It is rather the 
longstanding, well-known disagreement among the ‘experts’ themselves” (Sosa 
2011, 462). Intuitions are supposed to function as evidence for or against analyses 
of concepts. Yet intuitions chronically conflict. Short of a reliable, non-intuition-
based method for adjudicating such conflict, the status of intuitions as evidence 
for philosophical theories is therefore suspect. 
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(iii) Different populations perceive and reason about the world in significantly 
different ways (see Heinrich et al. 2010). This is unproblematic if conceptual 
commonalities obtain despite such cultural differences, or if such differences do 
not influence intuitions regarding concepts of interest to philosophers. But the 
evidence seems to tell against both possibilities: it looks like cultural differences 
often lead to systematically different and incompatible intuitions (see Zarpentine, 
Cipoletti, and Bishop 2012). This undermines conceptual analysis as a 
prescriptive philosophical methodology, particularly its aspiration to deliver 
universal conceptual truths. 
 
Much research in the positive program is motivated by the assumption––often drawn from 
assertions of philosophers outside x-phi––that “what the folk say” is pivotally important to 
philosophical debates. As Nadelhoffer and Nahmias note, these experimental philosophers 
“essentially agree with many traditional philosophers…about the relevance of folk intuitions; 
they simply disagree about the best methods for getting at these intuitions” (2007, 126). But if 
intuitions lack epistemic weight, what the folk think is of marginal philosophical significance.7 
In fact, work in x-phi itself often catalyzes and confirms worries about the epistemic status of 
intuition that undermine its evidential role in philosophical theorizing. 
To some degree, the probative power of empirical data and statistically rigorous analysis 
can help mitigate difficulties associated with the comparative reliability, track record, and 
irresolvable cross-population differences concerning intuitions [(i)–(iii)]. For example, x-phi can 
                                                
7 It may be relevant for other purposes. For example, important policy implications might follow from results about 
folk beliefs, especially about value-laden concepts. And philosophers should certainly care about policy 
implications. The critical target here is the relation of folk intuitions to theories about the nature of empirical 
phenomena (e.g. free will). 
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reveal when intuitions are largely based on biasing psychological mechanisms. But to the extent 
a positive program is committed to treating intuition, no matter how scrubbed of psychological 
bias and sources of cognitive error, as providing significant guidance for the second step, it 
remains vulnerable to the deficiencies of intuition-based philosophical methodology. 
Despite the deficiencies of traditional approaches to evaluating conceptual content, 
concepts remain indispensable to acquiring evidence, evidentiary inference, and theory 
construction in philosophy and science. A defensible method for concept evaluation and 
determination is therefore still needed. Explication offers such a method. The next section 
clarifies x-phi’s important place within it. 
 
3. Experimental Explication Preparation. Many theories and arguments that concern 
philosophers involve imprecise folk concepts used in everyday communication, and towards that 
end they are relatively unproblematic. But for the same reason these concepts constitute 
inadequate cognitive tools for scientific theorizing, they seem to serve theorizing in philosophy 
no better. As Kitcher aptly describes Carnap’s diagnosis of the challenge: “Carnap takes an 
important project of scientific philosophy to be the construction of systems of exact concepts that 
can better serve the purposes toward which older, vaguer, more confused forms of language have 
been directed” (2008, 113). As a general method for determining conceptual content, explication 
was developed to place the use of concepts in philosophy on as rigorous and secure a 
methodological footing as science. 
Explication replaces or transforms a concept (the explicandum) typically drawn from 
“everyday language or…a previous stage in the development of scientific language” (Carnap 
1950, 3) into another concept (the explicatum) guided by four desiderata: retain similarity of 
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conceptual content with the explicandum, and increase precision, fruitfulness, and simplicity, the 
last being subordinate to the others. Scientific methodology supplies the benchmarks against 
which these desiderata and the concepts they employ should be understood. Similarity, for 
example, is construed quite weakly.8 Prioritizing precision and fruitfulness over strict 
preservation of conceptual content reflects methodology in science and as the unparalleled 
exemplar of epistemic success in human inquiry Carnap thought philosophy should follow suit. 
When concepts are characterized in science, antecedent conceptual content is readily sacrificed 
to achieve other ends, such as achieving empirical adequacy. Accepting the conventionality of 
simultaneity, abandoning species essentialism, and rejecting the frame-invariance of mass are 
well-known examples. 
Precision for precision’s sake is not the agenda. Rather, enhancing precision usually 
enhances fruitfulness, which is the agenda. Among other things, precision is a reliable tool for 
ensuring the empirical adequacy of hypotheses, models, and theories: that the predictions they 
generate accord with observations. Without sufficiently precise concepts, it is difficult if not 
impossible to derive predictions from statements containing them. Without such predictions, in 
turn, statements cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. Increasing precision also usually enhances 
mathematical rigor, measurability, testability, theoretical unification, etc.9 Achieving these 
objectives has a highly consistent, inductively well-supported track record of yielding the main 
currency in which science measures epistemic success: well-confirmed generalizations. For this 
                                                
8 Retaining similarity was a matter of degree for Carnap; minimum thresholds were not stipulated; and he only 
required that “most of what previously was said with the [explicandum] can now be said with the help of the 
[explicatum]” (1950, 6). In fact, “considerable differences” (1950, 7) in content were permitted. Explication may 
even change extensions. The similarity condition is therefore quite weak, but few further details were provided. For 
more on Carnap’s similarity requirement and the epistemic rationale underlying explication see Justus (2012). 
9 Carnap recognized that precisification is sometimes unfruitful, citing some psychological research at the time as an 
example (1950, 14). For a detailed exposition of the role of precision in empirical sciences see Hempel 1969. With a 
biological example, Justus 2012 examines how precision can be enhanced in different ways in explication.  
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reason Carnap accorded precision a central role in explication and measured fruitfulness in the 
same currency (1950, 7). 
In sharp contrast with traditional conceptual analysis, explication sanctions significant 
deviation from a concept’s intuitive content to increase fruitfulness (Carnap 1950, 6-7). 
Retaining similarity is thus subservient to fruitfulness in explication, for at least three reasons. 
First, many (perhaps most) folk concepts and even some concepts found in science are 
problematically vague. Concepts such as ‘intelligence,’ ‘life,’ and ‘substance’ are so amorphous 
and imprecise it is unlikely any explication that retains a high degree of similarity would help 
discover well-confirmed generalizations. Second, uncritical talk of the concept X can also lull 
one into a false sense of conceptual unity, that there is in fact a unary X. Machery’s (2009) recent 
work indicates how problematic this can be. He argues individual concepts typically decompose 
into three distinct types of entity––exemplars, prototypes, and theories––that are used in different 
cognitive processes. The upshot is that the putatively singular concept X is more likely an 
amalgam of distinct bodies of information, employed in different ways.10 “The concept X” 
therefore embodies a dubious presupposition. 
Third, many concepts possess content and encourage implications that would mislead 
rather than guide explication. For example, Griffiths et al. (2009) have shown ‘innateness’ 
conflates three dissociable features (fixity, typicality, and teleology). Explications of innateness 
constrained strongly by similarity would need to capture all three features and their 
interrelations. But since biological systems need not and often do not instantiate all three 
features, similarity-guided explications of innateness would likely be unfruitful. Recent studies 
in cognitive science reveal similar concerns about the concept ‘free will.’ They suggest free will 
                                                
10 Machery suggests this plurality warrants elimination of the notion ‘concept,’ but the data he discusses do not 
necessitate eliminitivism. This plurality might simply stem from dissociable cognitive systems that are nevertheless 
legitimate sources of conceptual competence and judgment (Piccinini 2011). 
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is sometimes taken to require an “executive self”––a fictional entity operating above and beyond 
the mental states and capacities human agents possess (Knobe and Nichols 2010). Given these 
results, similarity-guided explications would hinder the burgeoning science of free will by 
precisifying something nonexistent. ‘Innate’ and ‘free will’ are far from isolated examples; many 
other concepts contain content explication should avoid. In this way, empirical results from x-phi 
help justify Carnap’s lax similarity criterion for explication.  
These findings might make one wonder why intuitive conceptual content matters. Being 
tethered to imprecise explicanda appears to hinder, not advance, the development of fruitful 
explicata. But radical revisionism overlooks how folk concepts often describe features of the 
world and guide in theorizing about them, albeit rudimentarily. With its emphasis on precision 
and fruitfulness, explication endeavors to improve this functionality by developing more rigorous 
and systematic sets of concepts. To pinpoint the content that merits attempted preservation and 
the content that should be abandoned, however, a method for vetting explicanda is needed. 
Carnap recognized this and argued: 
 
[S]ince even in the best case we cannot reach full exactness, we must, in order to 
prevent the discussion of the problem from becoming entirely futile, do all we can to 
make at least practically clear what is meant as the explicandum…An indication of 
the meaning with the help of some examples for its intended use and other examples 
for uses not now intended can help the understanding. An informal explanation in 
general terms may be added. (1950, 4) 
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Unlike his detailed account of explication, in 1950 Carnap said very little about what methods 
would supply the needed clarification.11 Although the connection to explication was little 
discussed, the methodology he developed later in “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural 
Languages” precisely fits the bill. Guided by the view that “the assignment of an intension [i.e. 
meaning] is an empirical hypothesis which…can be tested by observations of language behavior” 
(1955, 37), Carnap described a method for uncovering intensions that involves presenting 
language users with a range of logically possible scenarios and asking them to make judgments 
regarding the concept in question. This obviously resembles the survey methodology of x-phi––
indeed it warrants identifying Carnap as an early pioneer of x-phi––but Carnap remained open to 
methodological improvements and alternatives.12 
With its insistence on using scientific methods to analyze empirical sources of 
information about concepts, x-phi complements Carnap’s (1955) data-driven methodology and 
embodies a key element in a defensible contemporary alternative to traditional conceptual 
analysis. X-phi has an especially valuable role to play in explication preparation (EP). 
Explicandum clarification, for example, is best achieved through empirically rigorous studies of 
the kind experimental philosophers conduct, which can: 
 
(i) uncover regions of vagueness in extensions and intensions of concepts. For 
example, work on ‘intentional action’ reveals uncertainty about the amount of 
skill needed to perform an intentional action (Nadelhoffer 2005). And work on 
                                                
11 Carnap very briefly discussed a few examples but they are rather uninformative, especially about what general 
clarificatory methods are appropriate. For example, Carnap suggested the explicandum ‘salt’ could be clarified by 
noting that one intends the concept as used “in the household language” (1950, 5). 
12 Carnap (1950, 8) approvingly cited Arne Naess’ (1953) monograph, then in preparation, which developed 
different methods for measuring ambiguity, precision, vagueness, and for testing the synonymity of expressions 
involving judgments over paired sentences coupled with statistical analysis.  
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attributions of phenomenal states uncovers ambivalence about ascriptions of pain 
to systems that are part human and part robot (Heubner 2010). 
(ii) reveal instances of conceptual pluralism underlying a notion. Mele and Cushman 
(2008) uncovered distinct patterns of disagreement across participants’ judgments 
about ‘intentional action,’ suggesting that more than one concept applies. Finding 
such pluralism is one key to diagnosing debates in philosophy that are “merely 
verbal” (Chalmers 2011). 
(iii) discover sources of bias that influence intuitions. Weinberg et al. (2001) found 
that cultural differences influence judgments about ‘knowledge,’ and 
Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) found that presentation order influences 
judgments of professional philosophers and laypersons alike regarding several 
moral principles. 
(iv) discover unpredictable (even if non-biasing) influences on conceptual judgments. 
Feltz and Cokely (2009) found that personality differences––specifically, 
introversion or extraversion traits––predict differences in judgments regarding 
‘intentional action.’ Weigel (2011) found that differences in temporal distance––
e.g. whether a particular judgment is imagined to occur in a few years or a few 
days––significantly influence intuitions about ‘free will.’ And Hitchcock and 
Knobe (2009) found that tacit application of salient norms impacts judgments 
about causation. 
(v) outline a concept’s central features and its dependence relationships with other 
concepts. Work on ‘innateness’ reveals its central features and indicates the 
problematic relationships between them (Griffiths et al. 2009). And work on ‘free 
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will’ has uncovered connections between ‘consciousness’ and capacities for 
agential behavior (Shepherd 2012). 
 
Such significant insights over such a short period evince x-phi’s promise, and showcase the 
valuable contribution it can make to explication. Of course, the contribution x-phi makes will not 
determine, in any particular case, how explication should go. Explicative choices (e.g., choices 
about which features of concepts to preserve and which to abandon) will be guided in part by 
theoretical aims particular to the case at hand. Even so, x-phi’s contribution to such choices 
secures a positive philosophical payoff independent of contentious debates about intuition’s 
evidential status. The payoff is admittedly instrumental. Its value is not thereby made tenuous or 
trivial. At the basis of explication is an appeal to something (well-confirmed generalizations) 
whose epistemic credentials are unassailable, indispensable to science, and, crucially, 
independent of intuitive conceptual content. The more x-phi facilitates explication by helping 
clarify explicanda, the more x-phi participates in a compelling philosophical methodology. In 
this way EP supplies a cogent positive program for x-phi, one that connects x-phi to scientific 
practice (through explication) in a way naturalists should find salutary.13 
A compelling new positive program for x-phi is an auspicious consequence of combining 
the two methodologies. There is, however, a pressing concern that reveals a potential limitation 
of our account. Recall Sosa’s claim that intuitions about normative truths of epistemology 
analogically function as observations do for science. One might contend that x-phi as explication 
                                                
13 Explication also allows negative program proponents to side-step a potential problem. Following Weinberg’s 
(2007) analysis of the worry, Ichikawa (2012, 744) argues a viable negative program must explain how the critique 
of armchair methodology “does not generalize to their preferred practices, including, at least, a great deal of science, 
as well as the use they themselves put to philosophical considerations in their own arguments against armchair 
philosophy.” But the concern dissolves once x-phi is understood as EP. A robust critique of intuition plainly fails to 
threaten explication because in it intuitions play no substantive justificatory role. 
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preparation leaves this view unchallenged. That EP plays a legitimate role in the evaluation and 
determination of empirical concepts does not establish it plays a similar role for concepts with 
epistemically normative content. Empirical concepts serve descriptive theories that answer to a 
world amenable to empirical investigation. Methodologically, explication complements this 
agenda. But normative concepts serve normative theories and it is entirely unclear they answer to 
empirical evaluation beyond, perhaps, the familiar counsel that ought implies can. Perhaps the 
type of conceptual guidance explication provides simply does not extend to the normative 
domain.  
This worry has bite. Of course, normativity comes in many stripes, and addressing them 
all exceeds the capacity of this paper. The next section develops the concern with respect to the 
specific normative domain explored by formal epistemologists. Section 5 defuses the worry, 
extends the relevance of x-phi assisted explication to concepts with normative content, and 
shows how explication can undergird methodology in formal epistemology. 
 
4. Formal Epistemology and the Limits of Explication. Explication and formal epistemology 
emerged from a kindred dissatisfaction with standard philosophical methodology concerning 
epistemological issues. The standard approach emphasizes what intuitions and sometimes 
fantastical thought experiments seem to show about long-standing issues and the problematically 
vague concepts so often at their heart. Definite views are typically expected about whether, for 
instance, the possibility of being deceived in the matrix precludes knowledge possession or 
whether veridical perception in a barn-façade subdivision is justificatory. Beyond having such 
convictions, they are also taken to reliably reveal how knowledge, justification, and other 
normative epistemic concepts should be conceptualized. A convincing account of why intuition 
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is trustworthy in this regard remains elusive and given its deficiencies in other areas––especially 
those in the purview of empirical study––there was ample appetite for alternative approaches to 
epistemic questions, which many formal epistemologists attempted to sate. 
True to their common disposition, formal epistemology exemplifies explicative 
methodology. Precision is a priority for both, and enhancing precision is frequently prioritized 
over fidelity to intuition. As such, formal epistemologists generally eye the intuition-driven 
maneuvers prevalent in traditional epistemology with suspicion. In a book attempting to bridge 
the disciplines, Hendricks (2006, 16) captures the sentiment: 
 
[W]hereas [mainstream epistemologists] often remain quite vague about the tacit 
assumptions and presuppositions of their conclusions, which are based on intuitions 
and folksy examples, [formal epistemologists] use intuitions and examples only to 
illustrate results obtained within a framework.  
 
Axiomatic logics, probability calculi, and vetted methods of statistical inference are expected to 
ground epistemic claims and supplant intuitive judgments concerning the accessibility of 
possible worlds, thought experiments, and the like. The objective is putting epistemological 
analysis on the same rigorous and scrutable footing as other formal disciplines such as the 
mathematical and statistical sciences. With the clarity precision affords, Carnap hoped 
explication would put all of philosophy––including its empirical and normative domains––on 
such a secure footing. Formal epistemology is an attempt at one part. 
Besides developing entirely new conceptual tools far removed from folk notions––
different game-theoretic equilibria concepts, maximum entropy principles, etc.––formal 
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epistemology also focuses on formulating precise surrogates for folk epistemic concepts, 
surrogates which often diverge markedly from entrenched meaning. For example, the logically 
demanding knowledge concept found in epistemic logics such as S4, and particularly S5, departs 
significantly from how human knowledge is usually conceptualized (see Stalnaker 2006). 
Meaning obviously changes if vague conceptual content is precisified, but further divergence is 
frequently sanctioned, just as explication counsels. A striking example is the enigmatic 
ingredient that transforms true belief into knowledge in non-Gettier cases according to traditional 
epistemology. It likely has no counterpart in Bayesian epistemology.14 The main obstacle to its 
integration is clearly vagueness, and paradoxes that emerge from attempts to render justification 
precise probabilistically suggest many epistemic concepts and issues will require 
reconceptualization in formal epistemology (see Shogenji 2012). Rather than inherit their 
imprecision, the hope is that problematically vague concepts can be replaced with a superior 
system of precise concepts. Formal epistemology endeavors to do for the theory of knowledge 
what game theory did for strategic thinking (see Binmore 2007). 
Carnap’s own work speaks to the converging agendas of formal epistemology and 
explication. Carnap explicated several theoretical concepts––e.g. analyticity, entropy, semantic 
information––with the same high degree of precision and technical sophistication exhibited in 
formal epistemology. In fact, Carnap’s (1950) most detailed exposition of explication 
immediately precedes his explication of several core concepts of formal epistemology, including 
degree of confirmation and logical probability. 
This confluence, the precision agenda of both, and their shared willingness to sacrifice 
intuitive conceptual content suggest explication constitutes the best methodology for formal 
                                                
14 Two prominent and comprehensive introductions to Bayesian epistemology say almost nothing about 
justification (Howson and Urbach 1993; Bovens and Hartmann 2003). 
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epistemology and grounds its philosophical value. Carnap’s rationale for explication could then 
be cited to neutralize the criticism that formal epistemology, although technically intriguing, is 
largely philosophically irrelevant because it departs from the central concepts and concerns of 
traditional epistemology. Moreover, the rationale reflects scientific methodology and is 
compelling for philosophy of science (Justus 2012), so surely it confers the same support for 
formal epistemology. That Carnap placed no restriction on explication’s scope as a concept 
determination method and wielded it for epistemic concepts seems to clinch the case. 
The issue is far from so straightforward. For Carnap, enhancing fruitfulness justifies the 
priority on increasing precision and licenses departures from intuitive conceptual content. But 
how should fruitfulness be understood? Carnap recognized two types. For empirical concepts, 
fruitfulness was cashed out in the incontrovertible currency of epistemic success: well-confirmed 
generalizations (see §3). For logical concepts, Carnap (1950, 7) simply stated that the currency is 
theorems without further elaboration. The more theorems an explication of a logical concept 
helps produce, the more fruitful it presumably is. Unfortunately, neither the empirical nor logical 
notions provide a defensible basis for explication in formal epistemology. The latter is especially 
problematic. 
Start with the logical notion. Developing axiomatic logics to precisify and systematize 
epistemic concepts and their relationships is a common maneuver in formal epistemology 
(Hendricks 2006). Just as axioms are said to implicitly define mathematical concepts, axiomatic 
characterizations of epistemic concepts are intended to supply similarly rigorous explications. 
Beyond axioms, theorems in such systems also reveal information about concepts and their 
interrelations. Evaluating an explication therefore depends on the implicit definition axioms 
provide, what theorems hold, and what they say about a concept’s content. Proposed axioms in 
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mathematics are evaluated similarly (see Easwaran 2008). But Carnap’s view that axiomatic 
explications should be judged by their facilitation of theorems provides very poor guidance. 
Simply counting the logical theorems facilitated is untenable: almost any axiomatic system 
would facilitate an infinite number. Moreover, explication is non-conservative in the terminology 
of formal theories of definition (Belnap 1993).15 It therefore may introduce inconsistencies into 
an axiomatic system. The vast number of “theorems” such inconsistencies would generate surely 
cannot redound to the fruitfulness of an explication. Not the number generated, but what 
theorems say seems crucial to evaluating an explication’s fruitfulness. Yet, if the pre-systematic, 
intuitive content of epistemic concepts is the proper benchmark for evaluating what the theorems 
say, the rationale for explication has largely been forgone. And since increasing precision 
encourages divergence from that content,16 it also seems to work against fruitfulness so 
construed.  
As §3 explained, Carnap’s account of fruitfulness for empirical concepts is not similarly 
deficient. But the glaring problem for formal epistemology is that this account is inapplicable. 
Unlike empirical sciences, formal epistemology is not attempting to describe or represent 
features of the world in any straightforward sense. Rather, it is primarily a normative 
                                                
15 In axiomatic contexts, a definition conservatively extends a theory T in a language L to T´ in an extended 
language L´ if for every sentence   of L, T proves   iff T´ proves  . Put informally, conservative definitions do not 
facilitate proofs of anything new (other than derivative consequences of extending the language). Acquiring new 
knowledge in this way is precisely the point of explication. 
16 No divergence need occur if the contours of epistemic concepts are extraordinarily sharp, such that increasing 
precision (through axiomatization or otherwise) more accurately reflects their true structure. On this view the 
rationale for increasing precision in epistemology would mirror methodology in physics and most other sciences: 
precision simply facilitates more accurate description, in this case of conceptual content rather than physical 
properties and processes. But this is highly implausible. How competent natural language speakers actually 
understand and employ terms representing epistemic concepts––and what cognitive psychology generally reveals 
about the fluid nature of concepts (Machery 2009)––shows this ambitiously precise account of our epistemic 
conceptual apparatus is mistaken. Of course, these results are not conclusive if epistemic concepts are abstract 
objects that serve as constituents of propositions (Peacocke 1992), and the realm of such conceptual abstracts is 
precisely structured. We believe this view of concepts (and conceptual structure) is untenable, but cannot address 
this complex issue here. 
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discipline.17 For example, Bayesian and Jeffrey updating specifies how beliefs should change 
when new evidence is acquired, not necessarily how they do. But relative to this goal there seems 
to be no counterpart to the well-confirmed generalizations that undergird explication as 
philosophical methodology. For formal epistemology, and normative disciplines generally, 
explication’s payoff is therefore unclear.  
 
5. Fruitfulness for Formal Epistemology. The willingness to deviate from intuitive conceptual 
content to increase precision suggests a close kinship with explication, but some formal 
epistemologists see the kinship with traditional conceptual analysis. Hendricks (2006), for 
example, attempts to unify mainstream and formal epistemology under the banner ‘plethoric 
epistemology.’ For him, formal epistemology provides “systematic, rigorous and structured ways 
of conducting exactly what advocates of conceptual analysis claim epistemology is about” (2006, 
162). In effect, formal epistemology is regimented conceptual analysis: 
 
The value of local [i.e. formalized] analyses of epistemic concepts for the entire 
community of epistemologists lies in the regimentation of global intuitions about 
rationality, justification, reliability and cognitive strength; the fixation of their content 
and scope; and the creation of systematic manuals for their actual and limiting use 
(2006, 162). 
 
Here the envisaged kinship is explicit; elsewhere it is tacit. Christensen notes that in practice, 
“Formal models of philosophically interesting concepts are tested largely by seeing how well 
                                                
17 Formal epistemology can also address descriptive issues about human cognition (e.g. Schupbach 2011). Analyses 
with this focus share goals similar to psychology and Carnap’s rationale for explication of empirical concepts 
applies. 
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they match intuitive judgments in particular cases” (1999, 460). Too much deviance from a 
concept’s intuitive content spells failure for formalizations that model it. 
Recent formal treatments of the ‘coherence’ concept illustrate the point. Coherence is a 
relation between bits of evidence: the more coherent the evidence for a proposition, the more the 
evidence justifies believing it. Several formal coherence measures have been developed. Due in 
part to constraints drawn from conceptual analysis, none have garnered consensus. For example, 
Bovens and Hartmann seek to develop a coherence measure that respects intuitions about “our 
pre-theoretic notion of the coherence of an information set” (2003, 34). They do so by 
constructing a hypothetical scenario and three sets of information about that scenario labeled α, β 
and γ. Bovens and Hartmann claim that “Without having done any empirical research, we 
conjecture that most experimental subjects would indeed rank the information set in situation α 
to be more coherent than the information sets in either situations β or γ” (2003, 40). Akin to x-
phi’s positive program, Bovens and Hartmann take intuitive accord with their conjecture to be 
substantive evidence for it. Siebel and Wolff argue similarly that failing to respect intuitions 
licenses “throw[ing] a significant number of probabilistic coherence measures overboard” (2008, 
179). That successful formal measures of coherence should pass intuitive muster is unquestioned. 
If preserving intuitive content is the goal, x-phi should be deployed. The empirically 
defensible methods of concept clarification x-phi offer apply straightforwardly to epistemic 
concepts. The information acquired can then guide attempted formalizations. And x-phi provides 
information not readily accessible from the armchair, by discovering influences and biases on 
conceptual judgments, instances of conceptual pluralism, etc. (see §3). 
But for the reasons already discussed, it is not at all clear this should be the goal. The 
case for skepticism about intuition’s evidential role in philosophical theorizing is no less cogent 
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in formal epistemology than outside it. Formal approaches to epistemological issues have several 
advantages, but formal precision alone furnishes no resources for addressing the evidential status 
of intuitions. Nor do intuitions seem to be the appropriate grist for formal epistemology. 
Scrupulously respecting intuitions about imprecise epistemic folk concepts seems misguided 
when pursuing the fruits of precisification.  
Formal epistemology is better construed as an explicative enterprise and x-phi as 
explication preparation (EP) situates x-phi as an important component of this comprehensive 
methodology for prescriptive concept determination. But against this methodology, the problem 
discussed earlier arises (§4): an account of fruitfulness is required that licenses deviation from 
intuitive content for normative concepts. Carnap’s account of fruitfulness for empirical and 
logical concepts does not supply such an account. 
In this connection, recognizing why Carnap chose well-confirmed generalizations as the 
measure of explicative fruitfulness for empirical concepts proves illuminating. Recall that 
explication is designed to reflect scientific methodology, and fruitfulness is intended to gauge 
epistemic success. There are various ways of evaluating scientific work, so why measure 
epistemic success by well-confirmed generalizations? Scientific consensus provides a 
compelling reason. Unlike other metrics––e.g. explanatory depth, mathematical rigor, 
parsimony––there is veritably no controversy that discovering well-confirmed generalizations 
constitutes genuine success. Most if not all empirical scientific work aims directly at uncovering 
such generalizations through experimentation and observation. And although theoretical 
scientific work sometimes concerns issues not immediately tied to discovering well-confirmed 
generalizations, they remain the goalpost by which theory is ultimately assessed. 
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Although consensus is much rarer among philosophers of science, on this specific issue 
there is surprisingly widespread agreement. There are disagreements about what some well-
confirmed generalizations mean and what inferences they license: whether generalizations 
concerning so-called unobservables ground abductions about ontology is a prime example. But 
no party to these disagreements disagrees with scientists that well-confirmed generalizations are 
the principal currency for measuring epistemic success. Moreover, most other scientific virtues 
have well-confirmed generalizations at their base. Besides the close connection with empirical 
adequacy (see §3), Sober (1988) has shown that parsimony is only a defensible inference 
condition when it captures salient aspects of the phenomena being inferred about, which is in 
turn only evaluable if the relevant well-confirmed generalizations describing them are available. 
And various explanatory virtues (depth, force, scope) all depend on well-confirmed 
generalizations to supply the resources for explanans and targets for explananda. Well-
confirmed generalizations are Carnap’s focus with fruitfulness to reflect these dependencies, and 
their privileged epistemic status in science.18 
What is needed is a fruitfulness metric for the normative concepts of formal 
epistemology. Attempting to develop a single account of fruitfulness for this domain is probably 
foolhardy given the uncertainty and controversy about the nature of epistemic normativity. 
Fortunately, explication is a flexible tool. In spite of disagreement about the nature of epistemic 
normativity, explication can be fruitful for epistemic theorizing. We indicate how below. 
                                                
18 Carnap (1950, 7) simply gauged fruitfulness in terms of the production of well-confirmed generalizations, but his 
explications (and the scientific methodology they reflect) demonstrate that well-confirmed generalizations contribute 
differentially, not equally, to fruitfulness. Explications that facilitate numerous well-confirmed, but nevertheless 
trivial generalizations fare poorly on fruitfulness. Generalizations with wider scope contribute more, as do 
generalizations that better catalyze discovery of further generalizations. Beyond these plausible general principles, 
Carnap’s reticence about fruitfulness likely reflects a pragmatic perspective: fruitfulness depends on the particular 
purposes for which explication is employed. Carnap’s naturalism and scientific orientation tempers this pragmatism 
(see Richardson 2008), but a pragmatic perspective provides a clear way to generalize explication to normative 
concepts (see below).  
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5.1. Instrumental Rationality and Dutch Books. 
Consider Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) concerning Kolmogorov’s axioms and 
Bayesian conditionalization. Whether synchronic or diachronic, these arguments reveal a 
dramatic breakdown of instrumental, means-ends reasoning. This is the source of their normative 
force.19 It’s not that bilked agents necessarily lose utility because they fail to grasp something 
intuitive about their degrees of belief or the bets offered, it’s that effective means-ends reasoning 
requires they adhere to certain norms. Explications that violated such norms––e.g explicating 
‘degree of belief’ or ‘coherence’ so that Kolmogorov’s axioms were violated––would be 
spectacularly unfruitful because they would utterly subvert effectively using those explicata to 
achieve one’s ends given one’s means. The empirical analog would be explicating ‘force’ such 
that mechanical laws no longer held, or ‘species’ such that evolutionary theory no longer 
accounted for their origin. Any epistemology, formal or otherwise, should guard against the kind 
of necessary utility loss DBAs procure. 
This insight can be leveraged because the type of normative guidance DBAs provide has 
wider scope than is usually appreciated. Formal epistemology obviously concerns more than 
conforming to probability axioms and conditionalization conditions. Envisioning how formal 
epistemology would help with more formidable bookies clarifies the issue. Consider an infallible 
bookie with limitless powers of coercion to compel agents to take bets according to their 
credences. Relative to an agent’s credences, such a formidable bookie can compel bet-taking and 
would offer bets about states of the world that at best yield no loss to bet takers. Though 
hypothetical, minimizing loss against this bookie indicates how the deliverances of formal 
                                                
19 Some have argued diachronic DBAs are flawed (e.g. Christenson 1991; Arntzenius 2003). Briggs (2009) 
convincingly responds to these criticisms. 
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epistemology can be evaluated; with less adverse odds and coercive capability the world 
effectively functions as such a bookie relative to our ends. Achieving ends requires gathering and 
cultivating resources, identifying impediments, and developing means to avoid or overcome 
them. To aid this compulsory navigation, formal epistemology marshals tools from several 
sources: decision and game theory, Bayesian arguments, classical and non-classical logics, 
statistics, etc. Humans need and utilize these tools to different degrees, but we are all inescapably 
playing such a game against nature. 
This perspective has philosophical precedent. It is a formal gloss on Goldman’s (1978) 
“epistemics.” But to our knowledge its application to formal epistemology is new, and it affords 
a notion of fruitfulness with attractive features: 
 
(i) It delivers many seemingly nonnegotiable desiderata. Two main goals of 
epistemic agents are increasing their set of true beliefs and minimizing their set of 
false beliefs. Explications that advance these objectives supersede those that do 
not, all else being equal. And of course the bigger the set of true beliefs and the 
smaller the set of false beliefs, the better agents would fare against the bookie 
described above. 
(ii) Since improving means-ends reasoning is the goal, intuitions (and our inherited 
conceptual scheme generally) have no privileged status. Rather, the emphasis is 
on better utilizing sources of beliefs and inference methods with reliable records 
of supporting instrumental reasoning. Unsurprisingly, science is the reliable 
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source sine qua non.20 This ensures a thorough integration of formal 
epistemology and naturalized epistemology. For example, explications of 
epistemic concepts should consider how they might cohere with and ideally 
improve the statistical methods that deliver well-supported beliefs in the sciences. 
Similarly, whether an explication improves instrumental rationality depends on 
accurate identification of the psychological mechanisms that underpin human 
cognitive capabilities and how their various aberrations, biases, and shortcomings 
can be mitigated (see Bishop and Trout 2005). As naturalism counsels, what 
psychology reveals about human cognition is therefore a critical component of 
epistemology. Diagnosing these shortcomings and improving our native 
capabilities requires a clear account of what is possible were we more cognitively 
well-endowed. Formal epistemology endeavors to give such an account, thereby 
providing an ideal benchmark by which human cognition can be gauged and 
possibly enhanced. 
 
It should be stressed that the story of what improves instrumental rationality is far from 
completed. Dutch book arguments for Kolmogorov axioms and conditionalization principles set 
a minimal standard. What further conditions share this status or help avoid less deleterious 
deficiencies––such as the epistemic frailty various reflection principles guard against (Briggs 
                                                
20 Science is the sine qua non we know. Other unimagined conceptual systems may be as or more efficacious at 
achieving ends. This is demonstrated particularly clearly in debates about the new-found merits of alternative, 
nontraditional logics, including dialetheic logics (see Priest et al. 2004). 
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2009)––is an active research area. One merit of this approach to epistemic normativity is that the 
results of this inquiry have a central rather than peripheral role within it.21 
 
5.2 Distinctively epistemic fruitfulness. 
For some, instrumental rationality exhausts epistemic normativity (see Brössel et al. 2012 
for discussion). But many maintain distinctively epistemic normativity cannot be reduced to 
instrumental rationality. Those formal epistemologists who seek to elucidate and apply 
distinctively epistemic norms––that is, norms about what ought (epistemically) to be believed, 
how beliefs ought (epistemically) to be updated, or how we ought (epistemically) to reason––
might worry that explication is unhelpful given their objective.22 The worry is misguided. 
Deploying x-phi and explication in formal epistemology does not depend on any particular 
normative goal, framework, or theory. X-phi assisted explication is a tool, and prima facie the 
features that render it fruitful for scientific theorizing reviewed in §3 render it fruitful for 
(distinctively) epistemic theorizing. Explication does not compel specific epistemic norms and 
objectives, any more than it determines the fact that well-confirmed generalizations undergird 
progress in science. Instead, explication simply facilitates compliance with and achievement of 
these norms and objectives. 
On the view that emerges, intuitions need not constitute the primary data for epistemic 
theories. Rather, epistemic norms might derive from broader theoretical considerations and 
                                                
21 Epistemic normativity concerns a narrower subset of the plethora of ends humans generally value. It is an open 
question whether the drive to enhance precision and willingness to abandon intuitive conceptual content advances 
those ends. For example, Stich (1990) defends a much broader pragmatic view of how human cognitive systems 
should be evaluated. Explications fruitful for formal epistemology may be infertile on this expansive understanding 
of epistemology’s scope. Blissful ignorance and intellectual myopathy may make one happier and even more 
biologically fit than the tortured polymath, but the icy logic of the coercive epistemic bookie punishes the former 
while rewarding the latter. 
22 For example, Joyce (1998) constructed a non-pragmatic version of the DBA that established the following: 
credences that violate Kolmogorov's axioms are invariably less accurate representations of the state of the world 
than they could be if they conformed, for a reasonable measure of representational accuracy. 
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goals, and empirical data about human psychology (of the sort x-phi offers) could indicate how a 
concept should be explicated. Admittedly, short of a comprehensive and compelling theory of 
epistemic normativity, no single account of fruitfulness against which to test proposed 
explications is available. But given its important but delimited function as a methodological tool, 
this poses no problem for explication. If anything, it is incumbent upon those committed to 
distinctively epistemic normativity to explain their notion of epistemic progress in much greater 
detail. Perhaps it would involve identifying merely verbal disagreements a la Chalmers (2011), 
discovering sources of bias or dependence relationships between epistemic concepts, and so on. 
If so, the argument in §3 applies and x-phi and explication offer valuable assistance. Formal 
epistemologists interested in elucidating distinctively epistemic normativity therefore need not 
worry that explication is somehow methodologically unfit for the task. 23 
 
6. Conclusion. Carnapian explication constitutes a naturalistic, data-driven, and epistemically 
compelling methodology for concept determination. We demonstrate the consilience between 
explication and a newer data-driven approach to the study of concepts, x-phi. X-phi has an 
important function within explication, a function we have called explication preparation. The 
upshot is two-fold. First, explication preparation constitutes a defensible positive program for x-
phi. Second, x-phi supplies valuable data about the concepts targeted for explication. 
As originally formulated, explication applied only to empirical and logical concepts. 
Given that normative concepts are the focus of much philosophical practice, one might worry 
that the methodology is of limited scope. We show that this worry is misguided. Explication can 
                                                
23 Given persistent disagreement regarding the nature of moral normativity, as well as the goals of ethics and best 
ways of achieving them, the same points plausibly apply to explication of moral concepts. Explication is a flexible 
tool, and we should expect many of its positive features noted above to transfer to the moral domain. Unfortunately, 
discussing how specific accounts of fruitfulness might work for ethical explication is a substantive project that 
cannot be pursued here. 
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be fruitfully applied in at least one normative domain, formal epistemology. There is thus no 
general reason to think explication fails as a methodology for the determination of normative 
concepts. 
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